If you live in the Northwest, you might recall the sad case of the police shooting of Charleena Lyles in 2017. She called 911 to report a burglary. Two officers responded and said she came at them with a knife, so they shot and killed her. She was pregnant. Her three children were home when it happened. Charleena Lyles was Black. The officers are white. Charleena had a history of mental illness, which was known to police. There were questions about why the officers didn’t try to use less lethal force given Charleena Lyles weighed only 100 lbs. A police review board found the shooting was justified.
The family sued the City, alleging negligence and assault by the police officers. The City asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including immunity, qualified immunity, assumption of risk, and discretionary immunity. The trial court struck the plaintiff’s expert opinions and dismissed the case on summary judgment, ruling the officers owed Lyles no duty under the public duty doctrine and they are immune from suit under Washington’s felony defense statute.
Yesterday, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.
Public Duty Doctrine
The Court of Appeals held that the public duty doctrine was not applicable in this situation because the Washington Supreme Court had recently ruled in Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma that officers have “a duty of reasonable care to refrain from causing foreseeable harm in interactions with others.” Because the Estate’s claims arise out of the officers’ direct interaction with Lyles, Beltran-Serrano governs and the public duty doctrine does not apply.
Statutory Immunity
The Court of Appeals also disagreed that the officers had statutory immunity under Washington’s felony defense statute. That statute basically grants immunity to a defendant if the person injured or killed was engaged in the commission of a felony and the felony was a proximate cause of the injury or death. The officers alleged Lyles was engaged in the commission of a felony—first degree assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder—when she was killed.
The Court of Appeals said there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lyles had the requisite mental state to qualify her actions as a felony. Both first degree assault and attempted murder require a special mens rea that the Court of Appeals held must be proved by the officers (first degree assault is a specific intent to inflict great bodily harm and attempted murder is specific intent to cause the death of another person). The Estate had an expert who testified that Lyles had a history of mental illness and was suffering from a psychosis at the time of the shooting. Thus, she lacked the capacity to intend to assault or kill the officers. The officers themselves described Lyles at the scene as disoriented, delusional, experiencing hallucinations, and exhibiting impaired judgment.
The Court also held the trial court erred when it excluded the opinions of the criminal psychologist. The court held it was admissible because Lyles’ mens rea is relevant to the statutory immunity defense and it qualified under Frye. The court noted that all of the officers’ objections to the opinions go to weight and not admissibility.
Qualified Immunity
To be entitled to qualified immunity, the officers must prove (1) they were carrying out a statutory duty, (2) according to procedures dictated by statute and superiors, and (3) acted reasonably. The last two factors are questions of fact. The Court of Appeals held there was a genuine issue of material fact as to both factors (2) and (3).
For factor 2, the Estate argued that one of the officers was not carrying his stun gun, as required by department policy. The Estate’s expert testified that the stun gun would have been appropriate as a nonlethal weapon to subdue Lyles. The officers’ expert disagreed. The Estate also argued that both officers violated Seattle PD’s use of force policy and Seattle Municipal Code. The SPD use of form policy requires officers use only the degree of force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional to the threat, and officers must use de-escalation tactics when circumstances permit. Seattle Municipal Code authorizes a police officer to discharge a firearm at another person when necessary to defend himself or another person from death or serious bodily harm. The Code also mandates that an officer may not use a firearm unless all other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would appear to a reasonable officer to be ineffective under the circumstances.
For factor 3, the Estate’s expert opined that the officers did not act reasonably in using lethal force and the officers had nonlethal options available to them. The expert also testified that using a firearm in close proximity to Charleena’s three kids was unreasonable due to the risk of hitting the children. The officers’ expert, of course, disagreed and said the use of force was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals held it was error for the trial court to exclude the opinions of the Estate’s two experts. The opinions address the reasonability of the officers’ conduct, an issue that is relevant to the qualified immunity defense. And the opinions are admissible under Frye and the Evidence Rules.
Given all the plaintiff's expert opinions are admissible, what we have now is a classic battle of the experts, which creates a genuine issue of material fact that the jury must decide.
The defense now has 20 days to file a motion for reconsideration, if they choose, and if not, 30 days to ask the Supreme Court to accept review. But at least for now, it appears Charleena Lyles’ family will get their day in court.